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10 October 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR

1. Attached is a note to Mr. Maury dictated over the phone to my office shortly after Admiral Murphy woke me up on Saturday morning (7 October) with an 0830 call to my home. Since I am to see Laird at 1500 this afternoon (10 October), I would like to touch base with you before I leave (around 1440) to get signals straight, for Murphy is sure to bring this matter up even if Laird does not raise it himself.

2. The general opinion of my colleagues (e.g., Messrs. Maury and Proctor) is that we should not participate in any joint briefing of Senator Fulbright with the Defense Department. I can see the obvious merit in this argument, though (as my colleagues also agree) if separate briefings are given, it will be essential that there be at least enough informal coordination to avoid the Senator's having his appetite whetted by being told perceptibly different stories by Paul Walsh and the Defense briefer (presumably General Pauley). Laird for his own reasons (including suspicion about what line we might take with the Senator) may push fairly hard for a joint session.

3. If separate briefings are given, it would be much better for ours to come first, with Walsh then telling General Pauley exactly what had happened and exactly what line he (Walsh) had taken, thus shifting to Defense the responsibility for maintaining Executive Branch solidarity. (Similar reasoning on Laird's part could of course lead him to the opposite conclusion.) On the other hand, there is little sense in rushing into a potentially awkward situation which, with luck, might evaporate for the moment if properly stalled. Maury's quite sensible and reasonable plan is to call Marcy late this afternoon (10 October), thus logging a forthcoming gesture from side, but leaving the ball in Marcy's court to call back if contact should not be established this afternoon.

[Redacted Signature]

George A. Carver, Jr.

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Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs

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7 October 1972

NOTE FOR: Mr. Maury

1. Admiral Murphy called me at my home early Saturday morning (7 October). When we talked on Friday, he was unaware of Defense's receiving any second letter from Senator Fulbright. After talking with me, however, he got in contact with the Department's General Counsel Fred Buzhardt who told Murphy that such a second letter had indeed been received, but that Defense had made no response.

2. Murphy suggested that since (as I had explained to him on Friday) we planned to handle our second query from the Senator by an oral briefing, that this would be a good line for Defense to take but it might perhaps be even better if our two briefings were jointly done. Defense would probably use General Pauley and Murphy thought it would be a good idea if Pauley went along with whomever we sent up to talk with Marcy and the Senator. I told Murphy that we did not plan to take any action with respect to recontacting the Senator's office until Tuesday and the briefing, if any, would certainly not be held until the latter part of the week. Hence, we had a few days in which to turn around. I told him I would take counsel with my own colleagues and be back in touch with him on Tuesday.

  
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